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This study examines the relationship between religious affiliation, church
attendance, and attitudes towards immigration. Following the ethnoreligious perspective,
I predict that those who identify as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, or
Catholic will hold more positive attitudes than those who do not affiliate, which would
reflect the teachings of their churches. I also predict that Catholics may have particularly
positive attitudes because of social identity theory. Attending church services should be
associated with more positive attitudes, according to religious restructuralism. Using
2006 telephone survey data of 1,135 Nebraskans from the Nebraska Annual Social
Indicators Survey (NASIS), I use binary logistic regression to test these theories and their
effect on seven separate measures of immigration attitudes. I found that while affiliating
with one of the religious groups did not lead to more positive attitudes, attending church
services at least once a week was associated with more positive attitudes on the topics of
government spending on immigrants and immigrants and crime. Results partially support
religious restructuralism and the theory that church attendance, not merely identifying
with a religious group, is what can improve attitudes towards immigration.
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From its formation, immigrants have traveled to the United States in search of a
better life. Many immigrants from around the world continue to make the journey; from
the years 2000 to 2010, almost nine million newcomers made the U.S. their home
(Migration Policy Institute 2011). Mexicans in particular comprise a growing proportion
of these newcomers. An estimated 11.5 million lived in the U.S. in 2009, which was
almost one third of all immigrants in the country (Passel and Cohn 2009). The successful
adjustment of these immigrants to life in the U.S. depends in part on the response of the
native-born population, making their attitudes towards immigration a relevant area of
study.
Possible issues shaping individual attitudes on immigration are religious
affiliation and attendance to religious services. Religion as a determinant has been
“virtually ignored” in previous literature (Brenneman 2008), but recent research has
shown that an individual’s religious affiliation and rate of attendance are associated with
attitudes towards immigrants (Brenneman 2008; Von Der Ruhr and Daniels 2003; Knoll
2009; Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2005). These measures, therefore, could offer an
additional explanation to negative attitudes towards our nation’s most recent wave of
immigrants.
The most recent immigrants have settled at a much higher rate in the Midwest
rather than on the coasts (Fry 2008). Nebraska is one of the Midwestern states
experiencing this surge in the foreign-born, mostly due to the growing food-processing
industry in rural communities (Dalla 2005). Immigration to the more rural communities
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in these states warrants closer study to examine how attitudes may be shaped in these
areas specifically rather than looking only at the national level as a whole.
Using the 2006 Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), this study
will explore the relationships between religious affiliation, attendance and attitudes
towards immigration of individuals in the state of Nebraska. Specifically, does one’s
religious affiliation as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, or lack of
affiliation influence one’s opinions of immigrants and immigration? Based on Green’s
(2007) ethnoreligious perspective and Tajfel’s and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory,
I predict that immigration attitudes will vary by membership in these groups.
This study will also examine the relationship between religious attendance and
immigration attitudes, regardless of religious affiliation. Researchers have found that
attendance to religious services can be a factor for whether church beliefs influence
individual beliefs (Green 2007; Lee 2002; Zaller 1992). Therefore, it is necessary to
measure whether the frequency of attending religious services affects immigration
attitudes, rather than just looking at the religious affiliation to which one belongs. Based
on Green’s religious restructuralism theory, I predict that frequency of attendance will
also be associated with attitudes towards immigrants.

LITERATURE REVIEW
An extensive body of literature exists on what shapes attitudes towards
immigrants. Among the variables studied, religious affiliation and the frequency of
attending religious services could be a significant factor. Literature has also shown that
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one’s religious affiliation and frequency of attendance has the capacity to shape other
attitudes, providing justification to examine these possible determinants further and how
they may be associated with attitudes towards immigrants.

Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration
Although exploring how religion and immigration attitudes are linked is a
relatively new area of research, examining how individual’s views on immigration are
shaped has been a continued effort by researchers in the field, and many possible
determinants have been identified. Partly because of a self-interested orientation and
perception of a competition for jobs, researchers have studied extensively how
individuals’ education, income, and skill-level are associated with attitudes towards
immigration. More recently, however, researchers have looked at how all of these
variables may be related to each other in shaping individual attitudes in a variable they
call “cosmopolitanism”.
One’s education has been found to lead to positive attitudes towards immigration
(Simon 1985; Moore 1986; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003;
McDaniel et al. 2011), partially because it is oftentimes lower-educated workers who
actually must compete with immigrants for jobs. Using data from the 1994 General
Social Survey, Chandler and Tsai (2001) were able to examine a variety of possible
variables and found that having a college education had the most impact on immigration
views. “College education seems to be a powerful agent for engendering proimmigration sentiment,” they concluded (185). Although their research focused solely on
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attitudes towards undocumented immigration, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found
further evidence that education contributes to more positive attitudes.
Because of the association between education and income, one would expect
income to also be associated with immigration attitudes. However, income has not
always shown an effect and oftentimes leads to mixed results (Citrin et al. 1997; Wilson
1994). Dustmann and Preston (2007) actually found that higher income was linked with
more negative immigration attitudes compared to those with a lower income possibly,
they said, because of the fear that taxes would go to immigrants in the form of welfare.
However, Citrin et al. (1997) found that personal economic circumstances, including
income, were of little importance in determining attitudes towards immigration policy.
However, a worker’s skill-level has been found to be associated with immigration
attitudes. Both Polavieja and Ortega (2010) and Mayda (2006) found that those who
worked in higher-skilled jobs were less threatened by low-skilled immigrants. Both
Haubert and Fussell (2006) and Dustmann and Preston (2007) found that labor market
competition between immigrants and native-born low-skill manual workers results in
more negative attitudes towards immigrants.
Previous research has found a relationship between living in a rural area and more
negative immigration attitudes. Many studies analyzed support for increases or decreases
in immigration levels and found that rural residents held more restrictionist policy views
towards immigration (Fennelly and Federico 2008; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade
and Hempstead 1996). Both Greenberg et al. (2004) and Bean et al. (2000) found that
rural residents thought that immigrants impinged on their quality of life. There is a
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perception that most immigrants are undocumented (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996),
and Fennelly and Federico (2008) point out that “this perception may be particularly
prevalent in rural communities where food processing and agricultural businesses employ
large numbers of undocumented workers” (153).
Past research has found that political ideology has some effect on immigration
attitudes, especially if one views immigration as a matter of public policy (Chandler and
Tsai 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1990; Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003).
These studies have found that having a more liberal ideology is associated with more
positive immigration attitudes or with being more open to increasing numbers of
immigrants. Similarly, age is often found to be negatively associated with immigration
attitudes, with attitudes becoming more negative as age increases (Von der Ruhr and
Daniels 2003; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).
One reason that more urban, educated, or liberal people have more positive
immigration attitudes could be because of a more global worldview, or what has been
called by researchers as “cosmopolitanism”. Measured by variables such as education,
job skill-level, whether one has traveled abroad, and holding liberal values, many studies
have shown that a more global perspective can be associated with more positive
immigration attitudes (Betts 1988; Bean 1995; Haubert and Fussell 2006; Chandler and
Tsai 2001).
Gender has shown to have some effect on immigration attitudes. Females are
usually found to have more positive attitudes (Chandler and Tsai 2001). These findings
follow previous research that find that females tend to have a more “other”-oriented
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perspective when compared to males because of differences in gender socialization
(Beutel and Marini 1995; Cross and Madson 1997), especially when regarding race
(Johnson and Marini 1998). For example, according to Beutel and Marini (1995),
females are more likely than males to express concern and responsibility for the wellbeing of others, probably as a result of differences in how they are raised. This empathy
for others could also pertain to immigrants and result in more positive attitudes towards
them.
Researchers have studied how cultural determinants can influence attitudes
towards immigration, regardless of one’s own individual characteristics. One theory is
that native-born individuals feel a sense of threat to their culture and everyday life, rather
than threat to their economic well-being. Quillian (1995) calls this “group threat” and
defines it as “the perception by the dominant group that an outside group threatens their
group’s prerogatives” (586). McLaren (1996), Tajfel (1982), and Hood and Morris
(1998) focus on this feeling of group identity and the feelings of threat it can raise
towards an out-group. Brenneman (2008) points out that “negative attitudes toward
immigrants…are often based more on cultural and identity threats than on actual
competition for resources” (9). For example, Chandler and Tsai (2001) found that a
perceived cultural threat to the English language had the most impact on immigration
views.
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Religious Affiliation and Attendance as a Determinant of Individual Attitudes
Like the factors above, religious affiliation and attendance could be important
determinants in better understanding how attitudes are formed. Studies have shown that
one’s religious beliefs can actually shape one’s attitudes on various topics that may not be
clearly religious in nature. Steensland et al. (2000) assert that “Americans are more
involved in religious groups than in any other type of voluntary organization, and the
breadth and depth of this involvement exert a strong influence on contemporary social
and political issues” (309). For example, religion has been shown to influence civic
participation, activism, and even election outcomes. Welch and Leege (1988) found that
Catholics’ religious practices and beliefs influenced their sociopolitical beliefs and
political ideology, moving them towards more liberal views. Green (2007) found that
presidential voting preferences often depend on religious affiliation, with those in some
minority religious groups more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Wald et al.
(1988) argued that the ideology of a church influences the individual political ideology of
its members. Verba et al. (1995) demonstrated that increased religious participation was
associated with increased levels of civic participation such as voting and participation in
political activism. If individuals view immigration as a public policy issue, religious
affiliation could also influence individual opinions on immigration. With immigration
policy constantly being a political talking point among politicians and a mainstay of
divisive campaign rhetoric each election cycle, being more vocal about immigration may
be a part of the increased political activism among those who affiliate with a religious
group and attend services.
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Also closely linked to the potential for influencing immigration attitudes, is the
consistent finding that one’s religious affiliation influences one’s stance on certain moral
issues. Such studies have found that attitudes on abortion (Leege 1983), same-sex
marriage (Wood and Bartkowski 2004; Whitehead 2010), and euthanasia (Hamil-Luker
and Smith 1998; Sikora 2009) can all be shaped by one’s religious tradition.
Immigration, if couched in a humanitarian or human rights context, could be viewed as a
possible moral issue similar to these. Therefore, if individuals see immigration as a
political or moral issue either in addition to or instead of solely an economic issue, this
research shows that religion as a determinant should not be overlooked.
Some research has shown that how often (or whether) one attends religious
services is important in shaping individual views. For example, McIntosh et al. (1979)
found in their study of white Protestants and Catholics that those who attended church
more frequently were more likely to be anti-abortion regardless of denominational
preference. In studying attitudes towards euthanasia, Sikora (2009) showed that both
religious denomination and attendance mattered, with those with higher levels of
attendance being more likely to be against euthanasia. Similarly, Michaud (2008) found
that church attendance was a better predictor than religious denomination of
environmental attitudes towards climate change. Green (2007) demonstrated that
religious attendance was associated with presidential voting preferences, with those who
attend more often being more likely to vote for the Republican candidate over the
Democrat.

9
Furthermore, Green found that those who attended church more often were more
“religiously salient”, meaning that respondents believed that religion dictated much of
their lives. In general, past research has found that those who attend church more
frequently are more likely to hold beliefs that are consistent with the church and follow
the endorsements of the church leaders (Lee 2002; Zaller 1992). This research suggests
that an individual’s thinking will more likely reflect church doctrine when the individual
attends church, not just if they identify with that religion.

Religious Affiliation, Attendance and Immigration Attitudes
Recent research has provided evidence that there is a relationship between
religious affiliation and immigration attitudes and has found that attitudes towards
immigration varied depending on religious affiliation (Knoll 2009; Brenneman 2008;
Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005). Exactly how each religious group influences
immigration attitudes may vary depending on each church’s teachings.
To explore how immigration attitudes may vary among Mainline Protestants,
Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics in the study and between those who do and do not
affiliate with a religious group, it is necessary to understand what each of the churches’
beliefs are on the issue of immigration Instead of looking directly at church doctrine,
which can be often be interpreted differently and selectively depending on each
individual, it may be more useful to examine direct cues from religious leaders. These
cues may have more potential than doctrine to be heard and internalized by church
members (Knoll 2009). Much research has demonstrated the possibility that public
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political statements and agreement by church clergy can influence church members’
attitudes on various issues (Djupe and Gilbert 2002; Smidt 2004; Campbell and Monson
2003). Knoll (2009) adds that “is it possible that members of religious traditions and
denominations whose leaders officially and/or publicly endorse a certain type of
immigration reform should be more likely to support those same reform policies” (315).
However, it should be noted that other literature exists that finds that clergy,
especially those in Evangelical denominations, hold different views (possibly more
positive towards immigration) than their congregants (. Regardless, it is still possible that
positive messages on immigration are reaching members even if many members still hold
less positive views than their clergy.
The three religious affiliations in this analysis, the Catholic, Evangelical
Protestant, and Mainline Protestant churches, have all been outright about their positive
support for immigrants and immigration reform that would benefit immigrants. The
Catholic Church, especially, has been very strong in its support for immigrants and
immigration reform. According to the website of the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, their position is as follows: “We bishops commit ourselves and all the members
of our church communities to continue the work of advocacy for laws that respect the
human rights of immigrants and preserve the unity of the immigrant family… We join
with others of good will in a call for legalization opportunities for the maximum number
of undocumented persons, particularly those who have built equities and otherwise
contributed to their communities” (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2002).
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Leaders of Evangelical Protestant churches, although more diverse than Catholics
because different denominations are included, have also expressed support for
immigrants. The Southern Baptist Church, the largest Evangelical denomination in the
United States (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010), has endorsed a guestworker program for undocumented immigrants and also expressed support for granting
amnesty (Land 2006). Richard Land, head of the Ethics and Religious Liberty
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, has said, “We have an obligation to
support the government and the government’s laws for consience’ [sic] sake (Romans
13:7)… As citizens of the Lord’s heavenly Kingdom and members of local colonies of
that Kingdom, we also have a divine mandate to act redemptively and compassionately
toward those who are in need” (Land 2006).
Leith Anderson, president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), has
expressed support for immigrants as have other leaders in the organization (Vu 2009).
NAE even has a humanitarian branch called World Relief that provides legal services to
immigrants, helps settle refugees, and provides other assistance such as English classes.
Officially, the organization points to the biblical foundations for welcoming immigrants
and supports expanded avenues through which immigrants can enter the U.S., emphasis
on family reunification, and ways for those who are undocumented to earn legal status
(NAE 2009).
Mainline Protestant churches, although also more diverse than the Catholic
Church, have shown their support as well. The website of the Episcopalian Migration
Ministries quotes their Presiding Bishop: “To make enforcement a central provision of
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our immigration policy not only fails to honor our historic tradition of offering refuge to
the oppressed, but also denies the call of Christ to welcome the stranger as if we were
receiving Him as our guest” (Griswold 2006). The Evangelical Lutheran Church of
America (ELCA) stated that it supports a plan to “provide a path to permanence for
individuals currently residing and working in the United States as well as their families”
(Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2007). The United Methodist (Gilbert 2007)
and the Presbyterian Church (Presbyterian Church (USA) Office of Immigration Issues
2006) have similar statements on their respective websites.
Only a few studies exist that examine how religion, whether measured through
affiliation or attendance, can affect immigration attitudes. Much of this research focuses
on immigration policy preferences and the economy and not on feelings towards
immigrants or their possible impact. For example, both Von der Ruhr and Daniels (2003)
and Daniels and Von der Ruhr (2005) measured whether religious affiliation affected
whether respondents believed immigration levels should be increased, decreased, or kept
stable. In the 2003 study, Jewish respondents were more likely to prefer that the number
of immigrants be increased, and in both 2003 and 2005 they found that those who
belonged to more fundamentalist denominations supported more restrictionist
immigration policies.
Similarly, McDaniel et al. (2011) in a national survey measured level of negative
attitudes towards immigrants with an index of eight items including whether the
respondent believed immigrants were a burden, did not pay taxes or learn English, took
jobs away from native-born, or threatened traditional American values. They found

13
support for what they called “Christian nationalism” in Evangelical Protestants, and that
this negatively affected their views of immigrants compared to Catholics and Mainline
Protestants. They defined Christian nationalism as “a religiously informed interpretation
of America’s national identity” and that Christian nationalists “believe that America has a
divinely inspired mission and link its success to God’s favor” (205). In other words,
those who ascribed to Christian nationalism believed that immigrants were a threat to an
existing American identity and that Evangelical Protestants were more likely to hold this
belief than other religious groups.
Brenneman (2008) used 1994 General Social Survey data to examine how
religious affiliation and attendance affects immigration attitudes. Here, Catholics were
more likely than other religious groups to be supportive of continued or increased levels
of immigration. One explanation, however, was that the national sample contained more
Catholics who were probably immigrants themselves. Jewish respondents were found to
have more open views as well compared to the other religious groups. Brenneman also
found that those who attended church more frequently were also more supportive of
continued or increased levels of immigration.
Knoll (2009) used 2006 Immigration Survey data collected by the Pew Hispanic
Center to measure whether religious affiliation or attendance affected respondents’ views
on immigration policy preferences. Higher rates of attendance across denominations
were strongly associated with more liberal policy preferences (guest worker programs
and amnesty). Again Jewish as well as Latter Day Saints Protestants held more liberal
policy attitudes.
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Therefore, recent research on the focal relationship of religious affiliation and
attendance on immigration attitudes has been limited and produced mixed results. Some
studies showed evidence of negative attitudes among Evangelicals and fundamentalists
and positive attitudes among Catholics, but these findings have not been consistent across
multiple studies. Furthermore, this research uses only national samples, which fails to
look at effects that could be unique to smaller geographic areas. Dependent measures of
immigration attitudes is largely based on policy preferences gained only using one or two
survey items and not on more comprehensive measures that past literature on
immigration attitudes show is possible (such as attitudes on how immigration affects
culture or crime rates). By surveying respondents about how they believe immigration
affects the economy, a community’s cultural diversity, crime, and their opinions on
government policies concerning immigration, this research attempts to encapsulate more
of the potential ways that individuals could express immigration attitudes and not just
broad policy preferences such as to whether they think immigration levels should change.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Three theories shape the theoretical bases for my hypotheses: Green’s (2007)
ethnoreligious perspective, his religious restructuralism perspective, and Tajfel’s and
Turner’s (1979) Social Identity theory. The ethnoreligioius perspective asserts that there
is a direct link between one’s religious tradition and individual attitudes. It is in the selfidentification of a particular denomination (along with those denomination’s traditions,
values, beliefs, and cues from church leaders) and not necessarily church attendance that
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drives the effect of religious affiliation on personal attitudes. For example, Catholics
who no longer attend church may still hold beliefs that follow Catholic teachings because
of prior socialization. Although Green originally used the theory to describe differences
in political behavior, Knoll (2009) argued the theory could also explain differences in
immigration attitudes among denominations. If this theory holds here, we should expect
members of the three religious affiliations to reflect the positive messages of their
respective churches compared to those who do not affiliate. Although some research has
found that Evangelical Protestants hold more restrictionist or negative views, others have
not and I expect that the ethnoreligious theory will apply and positive doctrine and
messages will be salient.
Social Identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) states that people identify with
and behave as part of in-groups and may display prejudice feelings and discriminatory
actions against those who are not part of that group. In other words, one’s self concept is
derived from group memberships. Part of the theory is that members maximize
differences between those not in the in-group to strengthen one’s own identity as part of
the in-group. These distinct social groups form as a result of these in-groups and outgroups and can result in differences in attitudes and behavior between these groups,
especially the behavior of one group towards another (Hogg et al. 1995). Because
members of religious groups self-identify in this survey, they could be viewed as
constituting social groups which differentiate from each other, meaning that there could
be differences in how members of each religious group think about immigration.
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One important factor is that many immigrants, especially those arriving in
Nebraska, are Catholic. According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2009), seventy-four
percent of the foreign born are Catholic, most of who are Latinos. From 2000 to 2010,
Nebraska’s population growth was sixty-three percent Hispanic (United States Census
2010). Because immigrants arriving in Nebraska are more likely to be Catholic and
because Catholics may perceive immigrants as more likely to be Catholic, Catholics in
this study may hold more positive immigration attitudes if the tenets of Social Identity
theory hold true. Furthermore, Catholics in particular have a long history in the United
States as an oppressed minority group. Once a target of the Ku Klux Klan and other
white power groups, Catholics may still feel a connection and in-group tie to this
historical legacy. Additionally, the Catholic Church already has a more clearly defined
pro-immigrant stance, a more structured hierarchal system to communicate that stance,
and a richer history of supporting immigrants than the other religious groups, meaning
that the ethnoreligious theory could apply as well.
The religious restructuralism perspective predicts that it is the commitment and
behavior in religion of each individual that has the most impact on individual attitudes,
rather than denomination. Therefore, in addition to religious affiliation, it is important to
examine how commitment to that religion might matter in shaping immigration attitudes.
Green measures commitment by how often the respondent attends religious services.
Because of each church’s positive stance on immigration, we should find that going to
church improves attitudes.
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Following the above theoretical framework, the hypotheses are:
H1: Those who affiliate as Catholic, Mainline Protestant, or Evangelical Protestant will
hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than those who are unaffiliated.
H2: Catholics will hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than the other
religious groups.
H3: Attendance, regardless of religious affiliation, will have a positive association with
attitudes towards immigration.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 tests the ethnoreligious perspective, Hypothesis 2 tests
both ethnoreligious perspective and social identity theory, and Hypothesis 3 tests
religious restructuralism.

DATA
This study will analyze individual attitudes by using the 2006 Nebraska Annual
Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), a random digit dialing telephone survey of 1,821
adults in Nebraska conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research (BOSR) at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. BOSR has conducted the cross-sectional survey on the
quality of life in Nebraska since 1977, and issues covered vary from year to year. The
sampling frame used is non-institutionalized persons living in households with listed
telephone numbers across Nebraska, excluding those under 19 years of age, those in
custodial institutions and on military reservations, and those without telephones. Once a
person is reached within the sampling frame, the person in the household to be
interviewed is chosen based on a computer-generated random number. People without
listed telephone numbers or without telephones are in our population but not able to be in
the sampling frame.
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For all variables, those with missing cases were dropped and not included in the
analysis. Although, the full dataset includes 1,821 people, after dropping those who were
not categorized into one of the four religious groups in the analysis (Mainline Protestant,
Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Unaffiliated) or who did not answer the
demographic variables used, the total number of respondents used for the analysis comes
to 1,135. Total n drops to 965 for analyses only among those who affiliate with a
religious group. For each regression, missing data from the seven dependent variables
was also dropped. Therefore, each dependent variable has a different n, but this method
prevents respondents from being dropped from the analysis who failed to answer all
seven survey questions used to form the dependent variables. A description of all
variables used for analyses can be found in Table 1.
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
Because of the sampling procedure utilized, the data used for this analysis should
be fairly representative of Nebraskans as a whole. As expected with telephone surveys,
older respondents were overrepresented, with 25.6% of this sample being over 65, while
2009 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates predict the number is only 13.3%.
Following this trend, those in the sample who were 45 to 64 made up 41.8%, but make up
only 25.0% of ACS estimates. Younger respondents were underrepresented, with only
4.2% of the sample being 19 to 24, with 11.0% of ACS respondents being 18 to 24. ACS
estimates the number of 25-44 year-olds to be 36.7%, with only 28.4% of the sample
being in this age group. Females were also overrepresented at 59.8% of the sample but
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only 50.7% of Census estimates (2010). Weights were calculated for each respondent
according to these variables and used for each analysis.

Dependent Variables
Seven separate variables were used to measure respondents’ attitudes towards
immigration. Topics covered include government spending on immigrants and
immigration’s effect on crime, diversity, and the economy. These areas reflect previous
literature’s findings on how respondents voice these attitudes and allow for higher
content validity of the overall measure of immigration attitudes. Although some of the
items reflect similar content, I chose to study them individually because of low
Cronbach’s alphas when combined. Refer to Table 2 for the distribution and n’s of these
variables.
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
There were two 5-item formats to these questions. The first ranged from strongly
agreed to strongly disagreed. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed
with one of the following scenarios: “immigrants improve the economy of my
community”, “the government spends too much money assisting immigrants”, and
“immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”. Variables
were reverse coded so that 1=”strongly disagree”, 2= “disagree”, 3= “neither agree or
disagree”, 4= “agree”, and 5= “strongly agree”.
The second format ranged from very likely to very unlikely. Respondents were
asked if the following scenarios were likely or unlikely when asked “What do you think
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will happen as a result of more immigrants to your community”: “higher economic
growth”, “people born in my community losing their jobs”, “higher crime rates”, and
“making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”. Variables were reverse
coded so that 1=”very unlikely”, 2= “somewhat unlikely”, 3= “neither likely or unlikely”,
4= “somewhat likely”, and 5= “very likely”.
Respondents were particularly negative on the topics of government spending on
immigration and how they thought immigration affected crime rates. An overwhelming
majority of those surveyed (69.6%) agreed with the statement that “the government
spends too much money assisting immigrants”, with only 19.2% disagreeing. Over twothirds of the sample (67.8%) said that “higher crime rates” were likely as a result of more
immigrants coming to their community. Well over a quarter (28.9%) responded that
higher crime rates were “very likely”. Similarly, about half (49.1%) disagreed that
“immigrants improve the economy of my community”, and 53.9% thought it was
unlikely that immigration would result in “higher economic growth”. Respondents were
divided on how likely the scenario of “people born in my community losing their jobs”
would be due to immigration, with 47.9% saying that it was unlikely and 46.0% saying it
was likely.
Respondents were more positive about the possibility for more diversity and
openness. Over half (57.5%) agreed that “immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural
diversity of my community”. Two-thirds (66%) thought it was likely that immigration
was “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”.
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For analysis, these response choices were collapsed into dichotomous variables,
with “strongly agree”/“very likely” and “agree”/“somewhat likely”=1 and “neither agree
or disagree”/“neither likely or unlikely”, “disagree”/“somewhat unlikely”, and “strongly
disagree”/“very unlikely”=0. In other words, those coded as 1 are all respondents who
agreed with the statement of each dependent variable or thought the scenario in that
statement was likely with immigration.

Independent Variables
Respondents were grouped into four separate religious affiliations: Catholics,
Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Unaffiliated. These groups were
formed using the RELTRAD classification method, which groups single denominations
into seven larger groups by those sharing similar doctrine and religious tradition
(Steensland et al. 2000). In determining the categorization of denominations as either
Evangelical or Mainline, Steensland et al. (2000) note that “Mainline denominations have
typically emphasized an accommodating stance toward modernity, a proactive view on
issues of social and economic justice, and pluralism in their tolerance of varied individual
beliefs” (293-294). Conversely, Evangelical denominations “have typically sought more
separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual
conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious doctrines” (294). This
method is considered an improvement over previous classification schemes because it
more accurately organizes Mainline and Evangelical Protestants and is better able to
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study trends in American religion because of more accurate classification of all
denominations.
In both this sample and nationally, the four groups included as independent
variables are the largest and encapsulate most of the total population. According to a
2007 survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Evangelical
Protestants are the largest group at 26.3%, followed closely by Catholics (23.9%), then
Mainline Protestants (18.1%), and lastly Unaffiliated (16.1%). This sample of
Nebraskans shows similar numbers for who the four largest groups are, but Catholics
have the most members at 25.0%, followed by Mainline Protestants (20.8%), Evangelical
Protestants (18.3%), and Unaffiliated (12.9%). Those labeled as unaffiliated answered no
to the question “Regardless of whether you now attend religious services, do you identify
with any particular religious tradition, denomination, or church?” Those who did not fit
into one of these four groups (such as those who identified as Jewish or Muslims) were
dropped from the analysis because they made up a very small proportion of the total n.
Also, because the Protestant groups required a longer line of questioning to determine
RELTRAD classification, it is possible that more Protestants were dropped from the
survey before being placed into one of the four groups.
A variable was also created to indicate those who affiliate with any of the three
religious groups. Affiliated is labeled as 1= Catholic, Mainline Protestant, or Evangelical
Protestant and 0= Unaffiliated. Refer to Table 3 for the distribution and n’s for the
religious groups.
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
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As discussed above, church attendance may affect immigration attitudes
separately from religious affiliation. Therefore, attendance is included and measured by
the variable Frequent Attendance (1= “several times a week” or “once a week” and 0=
“nearly every week”, “about once a month”, “several times a year”, “about once a year”,
“less than once a year”, and “never”. Over half of respondents said they were frequent
attendees (55.4%). Refer to Table 3 for distribution and n’s of the attendance variables.

Controls
Researchers have found many possible determinants of immigration attitudes.
These previous findings guided the selection of control variables. Education is measured
by Some College (1= “some college, but no degree” or “technical/associate/junior
college”) and Bachelor’s Degree or Higher (1= “bachelor’s degree” or “graduate
degree”). Those with a high school diploma or less are the omitted category. Age is
measured continuously by the respondent’s age at the time of completing the survey.
Female is the respondent’s sex (1= “female”). Political ideology was measured by
liberal (1= “very liberal” and “liberal”) and conservative (1= “conservative” and “very
conservative”). Those who responded “middle-of-the-road” are the omitted category.
All respondents who did not answer “white (Caucasian)” were collapsed into the control
variable nonwhite (Minorities make up only 5.7% of the sample). Urbanity is measured
by urban (1= “town or city”, 0= “farm” and “open country but not a farm”). Income was
recoded to a five-category variable consisting of equal $25,000 increments to facilitate
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interpretation (1= $24,999 or less and 5= $100,000 or more). Refer to Table 3 for
distribution and n’s of these variables.

METHOD
I use Binary Logistic Regression (Long 1997) as my analysis technique. This
statistical method allows for determining the differential outcomes that the independent
variables have on the outcome of the dependent variable. Odds ratios were used to
calculate the likelihood of respondents agreeing with each dependent variable or the
likelihood they believed each statement was more likely with immigration.
The analysis contains seven models. Model 1 tests the focal relationship between
having a religious affiliation and immigration attitudes. This model only includes
variables measuring religious affiliation for each of the seven dependent variables.
According to Hypothesis 1 and the ethnoreligious perspective that posits that there is an
association between religious affiliation and individual attitudes, those who affiliate
should have more positive attitudes towards immigration.
Model 2 includes the control variables to examine their effect on the focal
relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes. A reduction of any
significant findings from Model 1 could be interpreted as moderating the effect of the
controls on the focal relationship.
Model 3 tests the effect of specific religious affiliation on immigration attitudes,
with Catholic and Evangelical Protestant as independent variables (Those who are
unaffiliated are dropped from this and later models, bringing the total n to 965). Here we
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can test Hypothesis 2, the prediction that both the ethnoreligious perspective and Social
Identity theory will apply and Catholics will have more positive attitudes towards
immigrants than the other religious groups. We will also be able to check for any
unexpected variation not predicted by our hypotheses among the three religious groups in
how they are associated with immigration attitudes. Mainline Protestant is the omitted
category in this model.
Model 4 adds control variables to the relationship between religious affiliation
and immigration attitudes. Similar to Model 2, we can examine whether the control
variables are influencing this focal relationship, except here those who affiliate are
divided into separate religious groups. Again, a disappearance of any significant findings
from Model 3 would suggest it is one of the control variables influencing results
indicating a moderating relationship between religious groups and immigration attitudes.
Model 5 tests only church attendance on the dependent variables. This allows us
to test Hypothesis 3 and the religious restructuralism perspective, which posits that
church attendance improves attitudes regardless of religious affiliation. The added
variable of church attendance should be associated with more positive attitudes if
Hypothesis 3 applies.
Model 6 adds control variables to the focal relationship between church
attendance and immigration attitudes. Again, a disappearance of any significant findings
could mean that it is control variables- and not church attendance- which is causing
differences in attitudes between frequent attendees and non-frequent attendees in Model
5. However, significant findings in this model between frequent attendance and positive
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immigration attitudes would further support Hypothesis 3 and the religious
restructuralism perspective.
Model 7 includes each religious group, attendance, and the control variables.
This allows for the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 3 simultaneously to see if there are
changes from Models 3 through 6 and allows for the testing of the focal relationships of
religious group and attendance on immigration attitudes. This model is needed, for
example, because differences in levels of attendance could have an effect on the
relationship between religious groups and not actual differences in attitudes between
them1.
Mainline Protestants are the omitted category in Models 3, 4, and 7. This change
was necessary because the unaffiliated are not included in Models 3, 4, and 7 as these
models compare immigration attitudes only among those who attend religious services.
For the control variables, “high school or lower” for the education variables and
“moderate” for the political ideology variables were the omitted categories.

RESULTS
Results from the analyses can be seen in Tables 4 through 10. Model 1 examines
only the relationship between affiliating with a religious group regressed on immigration
attitudes. None of the seven variables in this model had a significant relationship with
those having a religious affiliation (“immigrants improve the economy of my
community”, “the government spends too much money assisting immigrants”,

1

An eighth model including interactions between religious groups and attendance was run but did not
produce statistically significant results.
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“immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”, “people born
in my community losing their jobs”, “higher economic growth”, “higher crime rates”, and
“making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”).
(TABLES 4 THROUGH 10 ABOUT HERE)
Model 2 again indicates no significant relationship between the affiliated and any
of the seven dependent variables after including the control variables in the analysis.
Having a bachelor’s degree or higher was significant for six of the seven dependent
variables and was associated with more positive attitudes (p≤0.001). Some of the other
control variables also had a significant relationship with a majority (4 out of 7) of the
dependent variables at a significance level of at least 0.05 (liberal, nonwhite, and urban).
All three of these control variables were associated with more positive attitudes towards
immigration.
Models 3 and 4 follow the same form as the previous two models but compare
only the three religious groups to each other, with those who are unaffiliated dropped
from the analysis. Model 3 examines only the relationship between religious affiliation
and immigration attitudes, with Mainline Protestants as the omitted category. None of
the religious groups had a significant association with any of the immigration attitudes
variables, although the odds of Evangelicals agreeing with the variable “Immigrants
improve the economy of my community” were somewhat less than Mainlines (p≤0.10).
Model 4 adds demographic controls to the focal relationship. The odds of
Evangelicals agreeing that “Immigrants improve the economy of my community” were
36 percent less, with the variable moving from marginally significant to significant from
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Model 4 to Model 3 (p≤ 0.05). Evangelicals also moved to marginal significance for the
other variable regarding the economy; the odds of them responding that “higher
economic growth” was a likely outcome as a result of more immigration were 31 percent
less than Mainlines (p≤ 0.10). The odds of Catholics responding that it is likely that
immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures” were 28
percent less, but this was also just marginally significant (p≤ 0.10). Similar to Model 2,
many of the controls were significant. Having at least a bachelor’s degree was associated
with more positive attitudes towards immigration in 6 of the 7 variables at a significance
level of 0.001. The control variables liberal, nonwhite, and urban were associated with
more positive attitudes for 3 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.05.
Increasing age of the respondent corresponded to more negative attitudes also for 3
variables at a significance level of at least 0.05.
Model 5 introduces attendance into the analysis as an independent variable.
Higher attendance seems to be associated with more positive attitudes for some of the
variables. The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too
much money assisting immigrants” were 30 percent less than infrequent attendees (p≤
0.05). The odds of them responding that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of
higher immigration were also 27 percent less (p≤ 0.05) Finally, the odds of frequent
attendees responding that immigration is “making my community more open to new
ideas and cultures” were 30 percent more but only at a significance level of 0.10.
Model 6 added the control variables to the analysis between attendance and
attitudes towards immigration. Both of the findings from Model 5 remain significant.

29
The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too much money
assisting immigrants” were 37 percent less than infrequent attendees, and the odds of
them responding that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration
were 35 percent less (p≤ 0.05). The finding that was marginally significant in Model 5
(that the odds of frequent attendees responding that immigration is “making my
community more open to new ideas and cultures” were more than infrequent attendees)
changed to nonsignificance.
Again, holding at least a bachelor’s degree was associated with more positive
attitudes for 6 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.01. Female, liberal,
and urban were all associated with more positive attitudes for 3 of the 7 variables at a
significance level of at least 0.05 as was nonwhite at a significance level of at least 0.01.
Again, increasing age was associated with more negative attitudes for 4 variables at a
significance level of at least 0.05.
Model 7 included the religious groups and attendance together in the analysis.
Many of the findings from the previous models remained the same. The odds of
Evangelicals agreeing that “immigrants improve the economy of my community” were
40 percent less than Mainlines (a change from 36 percent in Model 4) (p≤ 0.05). They
also again approached significance for the variable “higher economic growth”, where the
odds of them believing that growth was likely as a result of higher immigration were 30
percent less (previously 31 percent) (p≤ 0.10). In this model only, the odds of Catholics
believing that more immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and
cultures” were 32 percent less at a significance level of 0.05. This was a change from
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Model 4 where there was only marginal significance. The odds of frequent attendees
agreeing that the “government spends too much money assisting immigrants” were again
less than infrequent attendees at a significance level of 0.05 (moving only from 37
percent less likely to 36 percent less likely). The odds of them believing that “higher
crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration were again 35 percent less (p≤
0.05).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study examines whether religious affiliation or attendance to religious
services is associated with immigration attitudes among Nebraskans. Very little research
has been done on this topic, and the research that has been done has shown that one’s
religion can be an important factor in possibly shaping these attitudes. No known studies
have focused only on a Midwest population, where recent high immigration patterns
compared to the past could create a more complex relationship between religion and
immigration attitudes. This study attempts to fill this gap by utilizing a survey where
measures exist on religious affiliation, attendance, and many possible facets of how
people express positive or negative feelings on immigration.
Results support previous findings that age, political ideology, race, education,
gender and urbanity are all associated with immigration attitudes. There are greater odds
that those who are liberal, nonwhite, female, hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and who
live in an urban area hold more positive immigration attitudes on many of the measures
used here. Holding at least a bachelor’s degree was particularly notable in determining
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more positive attitudes for most of the dependent variables. Also, age was negatively
associated with most of the measures; as age increases, attitudes become more negative.
Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the data; respondents who affiliated with one
of the three religious groups analyzed here did not have more positive attitudes towards
immigration compared to those who do not affiliate after control variables were added to
the analysis. This means that the ethnoreligious perspective was not supported because
respondents did not mirror the positive messages of their respective churches. Findings
here contradict Green (2007) and his theory that identifying with a church that espouses
certain attitudes through doctrine and messaging would lead to similar attitudes in
individual members. The religious groups all have positive statements from church
doctrine and leaders on immigrants and immigration, but this was not reflected in the
data, at least as it compares to those who are unaffiliated.
Hypothesis 2 also was not supported; Catholics did not hold more positive
attitudes towards immigration that the other religious groups. Social Identity theory,
through the commonality of identifying as Catholic, did not result in improved attitudes
by Catholic respondents towards mostly Catholic immigrants to Nebraska. More
surprising was the outcome that Catholics actually held more negative attitudes for the
item that immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”.
However, Social Identity theory may be working other ways if non-immigrant Catholics
are perceiving immigrants as more of an out-group which supersedes their Catholic
commonality. Another possible explanation is that non-immigrant Catholics are failing
to recognize that the majority of the new immigrants are Catholic at all.
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Evangelicals held negative attitudes for some of the dependent variables when
compared to Mainlines. The odds of them agreeing that immigrants improve the
economy and the odds of them believing that higher levels of immigration were not going
to lead to economic growth were both less than Mainlines, although the latter held only
marginal significance. These findings partially reflect results from McDaniel et al.
(2011), where Evangelicals held more negative attitudes on an index of measures which
included economic items. Results here are also similar to findings by Daniels and Von
der Ruhr from 2003 and 2005 that showed that Evangelicals were not in favor of
increased levels of immigration. Although not addressing the economy directly, perhaps
Evangelicals from these studies were against immigration for fear it would damage the
economy. McDaniel et al. (2011) posit that negative attitudes on immigration held by
Evangelicals could be the result of Christian nationalism, a theory in which Evangelicals
are more likely to feel that immigration is a threat to an existing American identity. It
should be noted, however, that in this study, Evangelicals only responded negatively to
these economic indicators and no differently than other religious groups for any of the
five other dependent variables which included more common indicators of threat (higher
crime rates and loss of jobs, for example).
The non-significant relationship between religious affiliation and immigration
attitudes compared to what the ethnoreligious perspective suggests could be the result of
regional differences in denominational practices and beliefs of a Midwestern compared to
a national sample. Another possibility is that Nebraskans hold more similar attitudes
regardless of religious affiliation, perhaps because of recent increases in the foreign-born
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population, higher concentrations of Hispanics in the Midwest, and the perception that
immigration is a new phenomenon to the area. Less variation in attitudes becomes more
possible when people respond to a “hot-button” issue and churches’ teachings or other
organizational efforts lag behind in their ability to influence attitudes.
Although Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported, results indicate support for
Hypothesis 3. Attending religious services at least once a week, regardless of affiliation,
was associated with more positive attitudes in two of the dependent variables. The odds
of frequent attendees agreeing that the government spends too much money assisting
immigrants were 36 percent less than infrequent attendees, and the odds of them
believing that immigration would lead to higher crime rates were 35 percent less. This
lends support for the religious restructuralism perspective where attending religious
services has more of an influence on individual attitudes than simply identifying with a
certain religion. In other words, the importance of attendance could be the reason
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. In order for the church’s positive messages about
immigration to reach church members, actually attending services is a key component,
not solely identifying with that church, at least for these indicators. This supports
Green’s idea that those who attend church services at higher levels are more “religiously
salient”, meaning that those who attend more often allow their religion to more strongly
influence their lives. Many previous researchers also noted the value of church
attendance in leading to more positive attitudes towards immigration (Lee 2002; Zaller
1992; Brenneman 2008; Knoll 2009).
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Regarding the main finding that attendance can help to improve immigration
attitudes, it is especially important to note that church attendance is oftentimes over
reported (Marler and Chaves 1993; Presser 1998). In self-administered surveys, social
desirability bias can easily occur, particularly in regions where it is socially expected for
people to attend church. When such a large proportion of the sample (42.2%) claims to
attend church at least once per week, it is logical to expect that the actual attendance rate
is at least somewhat lower.
If respondents are overreporting attendance and attendance is correlated with
more positive attitudes, then I might be overestimating the importance attendance has.
For example, if a respondent reports that they are a frequent attendee and that they have
more positive attitudes but they actually are an infrequent attendee, it may be another
variable altogether influencing both the drive to be seen as a regular church attendee and
someone who is positive towards immigrants. Any issues with self-reporting are going to
mask the relationship between the effect of attendance on immigration attitudes.
However, I may be instead suppressing the importance of attendance by
overreporting those who are frequent attendees. Again, those who claim they attend
church at least once a week may actually attend less often. Therefore, the actual attitudes
of those who are frequent attendees (which would theoretically be more positive than
infrequent attendees) would be partially clouded by those who are overreporting
attendance.
Although to a lesser extent, social desirability bias may also be occurring with the
questions on what respondents believe about immigration. Respondents may be more
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likely to report positive attitudes in a survey when their actual attitudes towards
immigrants are more negative (although much of the immigration measures here indicate
largely negative attitudes). This has been found to occur with surveys on immigration
(Ural 2009) and race, especially when an interviewer is involved (Kryson 1998).
However, because this is a telephone survey, the effect of social desirability may be
reduced. It also may be less of a factor here because the dependent variables ask about
immigration attitudes and not racial attitudes directly, although much of the immigrant
population are racial minorities.
Another limitation of this study is in how some of the immigration attitudes items
are worded. The respondent is asked how immigration might affect only their
community, not Nebraska or the United States in general. This wording may create
variance in responses in a state like Nebraska where immigration rates are highly
concentrated to certain areas. For example, for the item “Immigrants improve the ethnic
and cultural diversity of my community”, some respondents may answer no simply
because they recognize immigration rates to their community is low, not because they
hold negative attitudes. Fortunately, most of the items ask about what effect might occur
as a result of hypothetically more immigrants to their community, not the effect of
current immigration.
An association between church attendance and attitudes was found, but it may not
be church attendance which actually causes improved attitudes. Some third variable,
such as a drive to be engaged in and improve the community, could be driving both
church attendance and improved immigration attitudes. A longitudinal study would be
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helpful to begin disentangling causality, where infrequent church attendees are surveyed
after a period of increased attendance about their immigration attitudes. It is certainly
possible, however, that attending church would improve attitudes given the largely
positive message of church doctrine and teachings towards immigration.
In addition to possibly conducting a longitudinal study, future research could
continue to look at regional differences in how religious variables might affect
immigration attitudes. Because of historical differences in immigration rates and
settlement patterns, how or if religious affiliation and/or attendance affect immigration
attitudes may vary among smaller regions within the U.S. It would be interesting to
analyze how immigration rates to a certain region affect this relationship. Do places with
high or low immigration rates show that religion can make immigration attitudes more
positive? For example, if immigration rates are high, possible contact with immigrants
within and outside churches could affect the relationship between religious affiliation or
attendance and immigration attitudes.
Qualitative research examining if or how respondents believe their religious
affiliation or attendance affects their attitudes on immigration would add significantly to
the current research. Themes on exactly how this relationship works could better
translate church doctrine and teachings into useful methods to improve attitudes. This
information would also allow us to analyze the actual effect church clergy and the official
stance on immigration have and whether and how the messages are being transferred
from clergy to congregants.
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This study was able to fill a gap in the literature concerning the possible effect of
religious affiliation and attendance on immigration attitudes. The few past studies
looking at this relationship did not have such a thorough measure of the dependent
measures of attitudes. This study utilized seven separate items regarding a variety of
immigration topics in a region where attitudes may differ from national samples. The
comprehensive measures of various topics of immigration covered here along with the
differences in findings depending on the dependent variable show that future studies
should consider keeping items on immigration attitudes separate for analysis. Instead of
one index of all items, respondents were free to differ in their attitudes among the various
topics of immigration. For example, Evangelicals expressed negative attitudes on the
economy but were no different than the other religious groups on topics such as crime,
jobs, and government spending.
Results here point to the possibility that church attendance can help to improve
immigration attitudes. If we can further examine how this relationship works, it will be
easier to utilize churches and their message in the organized efforts to ease tension
between the foreign and native-born populations. Indeed, churches have already joined
in the movement to improve attitudes towards immigrants. If we can further understand
which methods best improve attitudes through this already-existing social network, we
will be able to help communities be more open to these newcomers.
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